My primary research focus is on ancient Greek and Roman philosophy. I also have strong research interests in early modern philosophy and ancient Chinese philosophy. My research projects explore the intersection of metaphysics, natural philosophy, and moral psychology across different historical periods and traditions. They involve three core themes: (1) the role of boundaries in Aristotle’s natural philosophy and its relevance to contemporary metaphysics and social philosophy; (2) the psychology of value-involved representation in Aristotle, the Stoics, and Descartes; (3) the different approaches to sagehood in ancient Chinese philosophy. Additionally, I have a long-term translation project on Russell’s lectures in China.
Publications
3. Descartes on the Source of Error: The Fourth Meditation and the Correspondence with Elisabeth [DOI], British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 30(6), 2022, 992-1012.
2. Russell's Two Lectures in China on Mathematical Logic (with Bernard Linsky) [DOI], Russell, 38(1), Summer 2018, 52-68.
1. A Critical Bibliography of Russell's Addresses and Lectures in China [DOI], Russell, 36(2), Winter 2016-17, 144-62.
2. Russell's Two Lectures in China on Mathematical Logic (with Bernard Linsky) [DOI], Russell, 38(1), Summer 2018, 52-68.
1. A Critical Bibliography of Russell's Addresses and Lectures in China [DOI], Russell, 36(2), Winter 2016-17, 144-62.
Selected Works in Progress
Aristotle at the Boundaries: The Stopping and Starting Problem, the Contraries Problem, and his Theory of the Boundaries of Processes (Dissertation)
My dissertation focuses on two fundamental problems in Aristotle that threaten the foundations of his physics and psychology: the first is “the stopping and starting problem”, which raises a difficulty for his physics regarding the transition between motion and rest; the second is “the contraries problem”, which is a puzzle in his psychology about the transition between different physiological processes involved in the discrimination of perceptible qualities. While he proposes solutions for both, they have long puzzled scholars. This is mainly because his solutions rely on a distinctive theory of the boundaries of processes, which might seem alien to commonsense and differs from modern frameworks. My dissertation breaks new ground based on a careful reconstruction of this theory, according to which processes include beginnings but exclude ends, though both are boundaries and cannot exist separately from what they bound. I show further that this theory is coherent and can serve as a firm basis for him to solve the stopping and starting problem and the contraries problem. Here is a longer version of the dissertation abstract.
The Stoics on Nonrational Impulsive Representation
The Stoics believe that at least some representations are impulsive, capable of eliciting impulses to action. For rational animals, such representations’ contents or their relation to other psychological states or processes might make them impulsive. But on previous readings, neither possibility seems available to nonrational animals because the relevant representational content, which involves values, is absent from the only kind of representation available to such animals, i.e. perceptual representation. This difficulty turns on the internalist assumption that impulsive representation necessarily involves the representation of values. Some might reject the internalist assumption and get around this difficulty by appealing to an externalist framework. I show instead that the Stoics could resolve this difficulty within an internalist framework, by appealing to some distinctive theories of content and perception.
Zhuangzi on the Equanimity Approach to Sagehood
I propose a new reading of Zhuangzi’s equanimity approach to sagehood that incorporates both psychological and metaphysical components. Many have read his understanding of equanimity as involving the subtraction of affects to overcome the shaped mind—roughly, a mind full of settled views. But this is just the psychological component, for which I think the distinction between fated affects and other affects is significant. I argue that it is also important to see another component grounded in a metaphysical picture about the Dao (Way). According to this picture, the Dao transcends spatial and temporal limits and produces all things; achieving sagehood involves not just overcoming the shaped mind but also recognizing the Dao, through which the world is one and in which all things are equal insofar as they derive from the same Dao and imperfectly manifest it.
Telic Social Boundaries
Social scientists and metaphysicians have largely assumed a framework for boundaries that takes boundaries to mostly have to do with demarcation. But recent empirical studies have shown that boundaries are more permeable than theorists have thought and involve salient hybridization processes. I propose an Aristotelian theory of telic boundaries that allows for permeability and hybridization. The central idea is that in social contexts, boundaries extend beyond origin-based social distinctions or categories, since there are also ends (e.g. shared aims) that serve as boundaries and can direct our actions to common goods. In slogan-form, boundaries are not just what divide us, but also what unite us.
My dissertation focuses on two fundamental problems in Aristotle that threaten the foundations of his physics and psychology: the first is “the stopping and starting problem”, which raises a difficulty for his physics regarding the transition between motion and rest; the second is “the contraries problem”, which is a puzzle in his psychology about the transition between different physiological processes involved in the discrimination of perceptible qualities. While he proposes solutions for both, they have long puzzled scholars. This is mainly because his solutions rely on a distinctive theory of the boundaries of processes, which might seem alien to commonsense and differs from modern frameworks. My dissertation breaks new ground based on a careful reconstruction of this theory, according to which processes include beginnings but exclude ends, though both are boundaries and cannot exist separately from what they bound. I show further that this theory is coherent and can serve as a firm basis for him to solve the stopping and starting problem and the contraries problem. Here is a longer version of the dissertation abstract.
The Stoics on Nonrational Impulsive Representation
The Stoics believe that at least some representations are impulsive, capable of eliciting impulses to action. For rational animals, such representations’ contents or their relation to other psychological states or processes might make them impulsive. But on previous readings, neither possibility seems available to nonrational animals because the relevant representational content, which involves values, is absent from the only kind of representation available to such animals, i.e. perceptual representation. This difficulty turns on the internalist assumption that impulsive representation necessarily involves the representation of values. Some might reject the internalist assumption and get around this difficulty by appealing to an externalist framework. I show instead that the Stoics could resolve this difficulty within an internalist framework, by appealing to some distinctive theories of content and perception.
Zhuangzi on the Equanimity Approach to Sagehood
I propose a new reading of Zhuangzi’s equanimity approach to sagehood that incorporates both psychological and metaphysical components. Many have read his understanding of equanimity as involving the subtraction of affects to overcome the shaped mind—roughly, a mind full of settled views. But this is just the psychological component, for which I think the distinction between fated affects and other affects is significant. I argue that it is also important to see another component grounded in a metaphysical picture about the Dao (Way). According to this picture, the Dao transcends spatial and temporal limits and produces all things; achieving sagehood involves not just overcoming the shaped mind but also recognizing the Dao, through which the world is one and in which all things are equal insofar as they derive from the same Dao and imperfectly manifest it.
Telic Social Boundaries
Social scientists and metaphysicians have largely assumed a framework for boundaries that takes boundaries to mostly have to do with demarcation. But recent empirical studies have shown that boundaries are more permeable than theorists have thought and involve salient hybridization processes. I propose an Aristotelian theory of telic boundaries that allows for permeability and hybridization. The central idea is that in social contexts, boundaries extend beyond origin-based social distinctions or categories, since there are also ends (e.g. shared aims) that serve as boundaries and can direct our actions to common goods. In slogan-form, boundaries are not just what divide us, but also what unite us.